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Abstract—Quantitative information flow aims to assess and
control the leakage of sensitive information by computer systems.
A key insight in this area is that no single leakage measure is
appropriate in all operational scenarios; as a result, many leakage
measures have been proposed, with many different properties.
To clarify this complex situation, this paper studies information
leakage axiomatically, showing important dependencies among
different axioms. It also establishes a completeness result about
the 𝑔-leakage family, showing that any leakage measure satisfying
certain intuitively-reasonable properties can be expressed as a 𝑔-
leakage.
Index Terms—information flow, 𝑔-vulnerability, information
theory, confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of quantitative information flow has seen rapid
development over the past decade, motivated by the need
for rigorous techniques to assess and control the leakage of
sensitive information by computer systems. The starting point
of this theory is the modeling of a secret as something whose
value is known to the adversary only as a prior probability
distribution 𝜋. This immediately suggests that the “amount”
of secrecy might be quantified based on 𝜋, where intuitively
a uniform 𝜋 would mean “more” secrecy and a biased 𝜋
would mean “less” secrecy. But how, precisely, should the
quantification be done?
Early work in this area (e.g., [1]) adopted classic
information-theoretic measures like Shannon-entropy [2] and
guessing-entropy [3]. But these can be quite misleading in a
security context, because they can be arbitrarily high even if
𝜋 assigns a large probability to one of the secret’s possible
values, giving the adversary a large chance of guessing that
secret correctly in just one try. This led to the introduction
of Bayes vulnerability [4], which is simply the maximum
probability that 𝜋 assigns to any of the possible values of the
secret. Bayes vulnerability indeed measures a basic security
threat, but it implicitly assumes an operational scenario where
the adversary must guess the secret exactly, in one try. There
are of course many other possible scenarios, including those
where the adversary benefits by guessing a part or a property
of the secret or by guessing the secret within three tries,
or where the adversary is penalized for making an incorrect
guess. This led to the introduction of 𝑔-vulnerability [5],
which uses gain functions 𝑔 to model the operational scenario,
enabling specific 𝑔-vulnerabilities to be tailored to each of the
above scenarios, and many others as well.1
This situation may however strike us as a bit of a zoo. We
have a multitude of exotic vulnerability measures, but perhaps
no clear sense of what a vulnerability measure ought to be. Are
all the 𝑔-vulnerabilities “reasonable”? Are there “reasonable”
vulnerability measures that we are missing?
The situation becomes more complex when we turn our at-
tention to systems. We model systems as information-theoretic
channels, and the crucial insight, reviewed in Section II-B
below, is that each possible output of a channel allows the
adversary to update the prior distribution 𝜋 to a posterior
distribution, where the posterior distribution itself has a prob-
ability that depends on the probability of the output. Hence a
channel is a mapping from prior distributions to distributions
on posterior distributions, called hyper-distributions [6].
In assessing posterior vulnerabilities, by which we mean
the vulnerability after the adversary sees the channel output,
we have a number of choices. It is natural to consider the
vulnerability of each of the posterior distributions, and take the
average, weighted by the probabilities of the posterior distribu-
tions. Or (if we are pessimistic) we might take the maximum.
Next we can define the leakage caused by the channel by
comparing the posterior vulnerability and prior vulnerability,
either multiplicatively or additively. These choices, together
with the multitude of vulnerability measures, lead us to many
different leakage measures, with many different properties. Is
there a systematic way to understand them? Can we bring
order to the zoo?
Such questions motivate the axiomatic study that we un-
dertake in this paper. We consider a set of axioms that
characterize intuitively-reasonable properties that vulnerability
measures might satisfy, separately considering axioms for prior
vulnerability (Section IV) and axioms for posterior vulner-
ability and for the relationship between prior and posterior
vulnerability (Section V). Addressing this relationship is an
important novelty of our axiomatization, as compared with
1Note that entropies measure secrecy from the point of view of the user
(i.e., more entropy means more secrecy), while vulnerabilities measure secrecy
from the point of view of the adversary (i.e., more vulnerability means less
secrecy). The two perspectives are complementary, but to avoid confusion this
paper focuses almost always on the vulnerability perspective.
previous axiomatizations of entropy (such as [2], [7], [8]),
which considered only prior entropy, or the axiomatization of
utility by Kifer and Lin [9], which considers posterior utility
without investigating its relation to prior utility. As a result,
our axiomatization is able to consider properties of leakage,
usually defined in terms of comparison between the posterior
and prior vulnerabilities.2
The main contributions of this paper are of two kinds. One
kind involves showing interesting dependencies among the var-
ious axioms. For instance, under axiom averaging for posterior
vulnerability, we prove in Section V that three other axioms
are equivalent: convexity, monotonicity (i.e., non-negativity of
leakage), and the data-processing inequality. Convexity is the
property that prior vulnerability is a convex function from
distributions to reals; what is striking here is that it a property
that might not be intuitively considered “fundamental”, yet
our equivalence (assuming averaging) shows that it is. We also
show an equivalence under the alternative axiom maximum for
posterior vulnerability, which then involves quasi-convexity.
A second kind of contribution justifies the significance
of 𝑔-vulnerability. Focusing on the axioms of convexity and
continuity for prior vulnerability, we consider the class of all
functions from distributions to reals that satisfy them, proving
in Section IV that this class exactly coincides with the class
of 𝑔-vulnerabilities. This soundness and completeness result
shows that if we accept averaging, continuity, and convexity
(or monotonicity or the data-processing inequality) then prior
vulnerabilities are exactly 𝑔-vulnerabilities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
reviews the basic concepts of quantitative information flow,
Section III sets up the framework of our axiomatization, and
Sections IV and V discuss axioms for prior and posterior
vulnerabilites, respectively. Section VI provides some discus-
sion, Section VII gives an abstract categorical perspective,
Section VIII discusses related work, and Section IX concludes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We now review some basic notions from quantitative infor-
mation flow. A secret is something whose value is known to
the adversary only as a prior probability distribution 𝜋: there
are various ways for measuring what we will call its vulnera-
bility. A channel models systems with observable behavior that
changes the adversary’s probabilistic knowledge, making the
secret more vulnerable and hence causing information leakage.
A. Secrets and vulnerability
The starting point of computer security is information that
we wish to keep secret, such as a user’s password, social
security number or current location. An adversary typically
does not know the value of the secret, but still possesses some
2We should however clarify that we do not view axiomatics as a matter of
identifying “self-evident” truths. A variety of axioms may appear intuitively
reasonable, so while it is sensible to consider intuitive justifications for them,
such justifications should not be considered absolute. Rather we see the value
of axiomatics as consisting more in understanding the logical dependencies
among different properties, so that we might (for instance) identify a minimal
set of axioms that is sufficient to imply all the properties that we care about.
probabilistic information about it, captured by a probability
distribution called the prior. We denote by 𝒳 the finite set
of possible secret values and by 𝔻𝒳 the set of probability
distributions over 𝒳 . A prior 𝜋∈𝔻𝒳 could either reflect a
probabilistic procedure for choosing the secret—e.g., the prob-
ability of choosing a certain password—, or it could capture
any knowledge the adversary possesses on the population the
user comes from—e.g., a young person is likely to be located
at a popular bar on Saturday night.
The prior 𝜋 plays a central role at measuring how vulnerable
a secret is. For instance, choosing short passwords is not
vulnerable because of their length (prefixing passwords with
a thousand zeroes does not necessarily render them more
secure), but because each password has a high probability
of being chosen. To obtain a concrete vulnerability measure
one needs to consider an operational scenario describing the
adversary’s capabilities and goals; vulnerability then measures
the adversary’s expected success in this scenario.
Bayes-vulnerability [4] considers an adversary trying to
guess the secret in one try and measures the threat as the
probability of the guess being correct. Knowing a prior 𝜋, a
rational adversary will guess a secret to which it assigns the
highest probability: hence Bayes-vulnerability is given by
𝑉𝑏(𝜋) = max
𝑥∈𝒳
𝜋𝑥 ,
where we write 𝜋𝑥 for the probability 𝜋 assigns to 𝑥. Note
that Bayes-vulnerability is called simply “vulnerability” in
[4], and is the basic notion behind min-entropy, defined as
𝐻∞(𝜋) = − lg 𝑉𝑏(𝜋). It is also the converse of the adversary’s
probability of error, also called Bayes-risk in the area of
hypothesis testing [10].
Guessing-entropy [3] considers an adversary trying to guess
the secret in an unlimited number of tries, and measures the
adversary’s uncertainty as the number of guesses needed on
average. The best strategy is to try secrets in non-increasing
order of probability: if 𝑥𝑖 is an indexing of 𝒳 in such an order,
then guessing-entropy is given by
𝐺(𝜋) =
∑
𝑖 𝑖 𝜋𝑥𝑖 .
Shannon-entropy [2] considers an adversary who tries to
infer the secret using Boolean questions (i.e., of the form “does
𝑥 belong to a certain subset 𝒳 ′ of 𝒳 ?”) and measures the
adversary’s uncertainty as the number of questions needed on
average. It can be shown that the best strategy is at each step
to split the secret space in sets of equal probability (as far
as possible). Under this strategy, a secret 𝑥 will be guessed
in − lg 𝜋𝑥 steps, hence on average the number of questions
needed is
𝐻(𝜋) = −∑𝑥∈𝒳 𝜋𝑥 lg 𝜋𝑥 .
Note that Bayes-vulnerability measures the threat to the
secret (the higher the better for the adversary). On the other
hand, guessing- and Shannon-entropy measure the adversary’s
uncertainty about the secret (the lower the better for the
adversary).
Although the operational scenarios described above capture
realistic threats for the secret, one could envision a variety
of alternative threats we might also be worried about. For
instance, an adversary might be interested in guessing only
part of the secret, an approximate value of the secret, a
property of the secret or guessing the secret in a fixed
number of tries. It is for this reason that the more general
𝑔-vulnerability framework [5] was proposed: it allows one to
adapt to many different adversarial models.
Its operational scenario is parametrized by a set 𝒲 of
guesses (possibly infinite) that the adversary can make about
the secret, and a gain function 𝑔:𝒲×𝒳→ℝ. The gain 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥)
expresses the adversary’s benefit for having made the guess
𝑤 when the actual secret is 𝑥. The 𝑔-vulnerability function
measures the threat as the adversary’s expected gain for an
optimal choice of guess 𝑤:
𝑉𝑔(𝜋) = sup
𝑤∈𝒲
∑
𝑥∈𝒳 𝜋𝑥𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥) . (1)
Regarding the set 𝒲 of allowable guesses, one might
assume that this should just be 𝒳 , the set of possible values of
the secret. This is in fact too restrictive: the adversary’s goal
might be to guess a piece of the secret, or a value close to
the secret, or some property of the secret. As a consequence
we allow an arbitrary set of guesses, possibly infinite, and
make (almost) no restrictions on the values of 𝑔. In particular,
a negative value of 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥) expresses situations when the
adversary is penalized for making a particular guess under
a particular secret; such values are essential for obtaining the
results of Section IV-B. We do however impose one restriction
on 𝑔, that for each prior 𝜋 there is at least one guess that
gives non-negative gain. This essentially forces 𝑉𝑔 to be non-
negative, although individual guesses (i.e particular 𝑤’s) can
still give negative gain.
Note that, as its name suggests, 𝑉𝑔 is a measure of vulner-
ability, i.e., of the threat to the secret. An equally expressive
alternative is to define an “uncertainty” measure similarly, but
using a loss function 𝑙 instead of a gain function and assuming
that the adversary wants to minimize loss. The uncertainty
measure, parametrized by 𝑙, can be then defined dually as
𝑈𝑙(𝜋) = inf𝑤∈𝒲
∑
𝑥∈𝒳 𝜋𝑥𝑙(𝑤, 𝑥), and is often called Bayes-
risk in the area of decision theory.
Due to the flexibility of gain functions, 𝑔-vulnerability is a
very expressive framework, one that can capture a great variety
of operational scenarios. This raises the natural question of
which other vulnerability measures are expressible in this
framework. Bayes-vulnerability is a straightforward example,
captured by guessing the exact secret, i.e., taking 𝒲=𝒳 , and
using the identity gain function defined as 𝑔𝑖𝑑(𝑤, 𝑥) = 1 iff
𝑤=𝑥 and 0 otherwise.
Guessing-entropy can be also captured in this framework
[11], [12], this time using a loss function since it’s an un-
certainty measure. The adversary in this case tries to guess a
permutation of 𝒳 , i.e., the order in which secrets are chosen in
the operational scenario of guessing-entropy. We can naturally
define the loss 𝑙(𝑤, 𝑥) as the index of 𝑥 in 𝑤, i.e. the number
of guesses to find 𝑥, and using this loss function we get
𝑈𝑙(𝜋) = 𝐺(𝜋).
Similarly, in the case of Shannon-entropy, the adversary tries
to guess a strategy for constructing his questions. Strategies
can be described as probability distributions: at each step ques-
tions split the search space into subsets of as even probability
as possible. Hence, guesses are 𝒲=𝔻𝒳 , and the loss can be
defined as 𝑙(𝑤, 𝑥) = − lg𝑤𝑥 (the number of steps needed to
find 𝑥 under the strategy 𝑤). Since the best strategy is to take
𝑤=𝜋 itself, it can be shown [11] that under this loss function
𝑈𝑙(𝜋) = 𝐻(𝜋).
In Section IV-B we show that 𝑔-vulnerability exactly co-
incides with the generic class of continuous and convex
vulnerability functions.
B. Channels, hypers and leakage
So far we have considered secrets for which a probabilistic
prior is known, and have discussed different ways for measur-
ing their vulnerability. We now turn our attention to systems,
which are programs or protocols processing secret information
and producing some observable behavior. Examples of such
systems are password-checkers, implementations of cryptosys-
tems, and anonymity protocols.
A system can be modeled as an (information theoretic)
channel, a triple (𝒳 ,𝒴, 𝐶), where 𝒳 ,𝒴 are finite sets of (se-
cret) input values and (observable) output values respectively
and 𝐶 is a ∣𝒳 ∣×∣𝒴∣ channel matrix in which each entry 𝐶𝑥,𝑦
corresponds to the probability of the channel producing output
𝑦 when the input is 𝑥. Hence each row of 𝐶 is a probability
distribution over 𝒴 (entries are non-negative and sum to 1).
A channel is deterministic iff each row contains a single 1
identifying the only possible output for that input.
It is typically assumed that the adversary knows how the
system works, i.e. knows the channel matrix 𝐶. Knowing also
the prior distribution 𝜋, the adversary can compute the joint
distribution 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)=𝜋𝑥𝐶𝑥,𝑦 on 𝒳×𝒴 , producing joint random
variables 𝑋,𝑌 with marginal probabilities 𝑝(𝑥) =
∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
and 𝑝(𝑦) =
∑
𝑥 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦), and conditional probabilities 𝑝(𝑦∣𝑥) =
𝑝(𝑥,𝑦)/𝑝(𝑥) (if 𝑝(𝑥) is non-zero) and 𝑝(𝑥∣𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑥,𝑦)/𝑝(𝑦)
(if 𝑝(𝑦) is non-zero). Note that 𝑝𝑋𝑌 is the unique joint
distribution that recovers 𝜋 and 𝐶, in that 𝑝(𝑥) = 𝜋𝑥 and
𝑝(𝑦 ∣ 𝑥) = 𝐶𝑥,𝑦 (if 𝑝(𝑥) is non-zero).3
For a given 𝑦 (s.t. 𝑝(𝑦) is non-zero), the conditional proba-
bilities 𝑝(𝑥∣𝑦) for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝒳 form the posterior distribution
𝑝𝑋∣𝑦 , which represents the posterior knowledge the adversary
has about input 𝑋 after observing output 𝑦.
Example 1. Given 𝒳 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3}, 𝒴 = {𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3, 𝑦4},
and the channel matrix 𝐶 below, (the uniform) prior 𝜋 =
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) combined with 𝐶 leads to joint matrix 𝐽:
𝐶 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4
𝑥1 1 0 0 0
𝑥2 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
𝑥3 1/2 1/3 1/6 0
𝜋−→
𝐽 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4
𝑥1 1/3 0 0 0
𝑥2 0 1/6 1/12 1/12
𝑥3 1/6 1/9 1/18 0
3When necessary to avoid ambiguity, we write distributions with subscripts,
e.g. 𝑝𝑋𝑌 or 𝑝𝑌 .
Summing columns of 𝐽 gives the marginal distributions
𝑝𝑌=(1/2, 5/18, 5/36, 1/12), and normalizing gives the pos-
terior distributions 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦1=(2/3, 0, 1/3), 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦2=(0, 3/5, 2/5),
𝑝𝑋∣𝑦3=(0, 3/5, 2/5), and 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦4=(0, 1, 0).
The effect of a channel 𝐶 is to update the adversary’s
knowledge from a prior 𝜋 to a collection of posteriors 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦 ,
each occurring with probability 𝑝(𝑦). Hence, following [6],
[13], we view a channel as producing a probability distribution
over posteriors, called a hyper-distribution.4
A hyper (for short) on the input space 𝒳 is of type 𝔻2𝒳 ,
which stands for 𝔻(𝔻𝒳 ), a distribution on distributions on
𝒳 . The support of a hyper is the set of possible posteriors
that the action of channel 𝐶 on prior 𝜋 can produce: we
call those posteriors inners. The probability assigned by the
hyper to a particular inner is the marginal probability of the 𝑦
that produced that inner. We call those probabilities the outer
probabilities. We use Δ to denote a hyper, ⌈Δ⌉ for its support
(the set of posteriors with non-zero probability), [𝜋] to denote
the point-hyper assigning probability 1 to 𝜋, and [𝜋,𝐶] to
denote the hyper obtained by the action of 𝐶 on 𝜋. We say
that [𝜋,𝐶] is the result of pushing prior 𝜋 through channel 𝐶.
In Example 1, the hyper [𝜋,𝐶] assigns (outer) proba-
bilities (1/2, 15/36, 1/12) to the (inner) posteriors (2/3, 0, 1/3),
(0, 3/5, 2/5), and (0, 1, 0), respectively.5
Since the outcome of a channel is a hyper, it is natural to
extend vulnerability measures from priors to hypers, obtain-
ing a posterior vulnerability. For all measures described in
Section II-A this has been done in a natural way by taking
the vulnerability of each posterior and averaging them using
the outer. Let Exp𝜋 𝐹 :=
∑
𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝐹 (𝑥) denote the expected
value of some random variable 𝐹 :𝒳→𝑅 (where 𝑅 is usually
the reals ℝ but more generally can be a vector space) over
a distribution 𝜋:𝔻𝒳 . We can then define posterior Bayes-
vulnerability 𝑉𝑏 : 𝔻2𝒳 → ℝ+ as
𝑉𝑏Δ = ExpΔ 𝑉𝑏 ,
and similarly for Shannon-entropy, guessing-entropy and 𝑔-
vulnerability. For hypers [𝜋,𝐶] produced by channels, from
the above formula we can get an expression of each posterior
vulnerability as a function of 𝜋 and 𝐶, for instance,
𝑉𝑏[𝜋,𝐶] =
∑
𝑦 max𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝐶𝑥,𝑦 , and
𝑉𝑔[𝜋,𝐶] =
∑
𝑦 sup𝑤
∑
𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝐶𝑥,𝑦𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥) .
Note that, for point-hypers, we have by construction that
𝑉𝑏[𝜋] = 𝑉𝑏(𝜋), and similarly for the other measures.
Finally, the execution of a system is expected to disclose
information about the secret to the adversary, and the infor-
mation leakage of a channel 𝐶 for a prior 𝜋 is defined by
comparing the vulnerability of the prior 𝜋—the adversary’s
4Mappings of priors to hypers are called abstract channels in [13].
5There might be fewer posteriors in the support of hyper [𝜋,𝐶] than there
are columns in the joint distribution 𝑝𝑋,𝑌 from which it is derived, because
if several columns of 𝑝𝑋,𝑌 normalize to the same posterior then the hyper
will automatically coalesce them [13]. Columns 𝑦2 and 𝑦3 were coalesced in
this case.
Object Type Typical instance
secret 𝒳 𝑥
prior 𝔻𝒳 𝜋
hyper-distribution 𝔻2𝒳 Δ or [𝜋,𝐶]
(abstract) channel 𝔻𝒳 → 𝔻2𝒳 𝐶
prior vulnerability 𝔻𝒳 → ℝ 𝕍
posterior vulnerability 𝔻2𝒳 → ℝ ?ˆ?
TABLE I: Notation.
prior knowledge—and that of [𝜋,𝐶]—the adversary’s posterior
knowledge. The comparison is typically done either additively
or multiplicatively, giving rise to two versions of leakage:
additive:ℒ+𝑏 (𝜋,𝐶) = 𝑉𝑏[𝜋,𝐶]− 𝑉𝑏(𝜋) , and (2)
multiplicative:ℒ×𝑏 (𝜋,𝐶) = lg ( ˆ𝑉𝑏[𝜋,𝐶]/𝑉𝑏(𝜋)) . (3)
Note that ℒ×𝑏 (𝜋,𝐶) is usually called min-entropy leakage [4].
Leakage can be similarly defined for all other measures.
III. AXIOMATIZATION
In Section II we discussed vulnerability measures obtained
by quantifying the threat to the secret in a specific oper-
ational scenario. Channels were then introduced, mapping
prior distributions to hypers, and the vulnerability measures
were naturally extended to posterior ones by averaging each
posterior vulnerability over the hyper.
In this paper we take an alternative approach. Instead
of constructing specific vulnerability measures, we consider
generic vulnerability functions, that is, functions of type:
prior vulnerability: 𝕍 : 𝔻𝒳 → ℝ+, and
posterior vulnerability: ?ˆ? : 𝔻2𝒳 → ℝ+.
We then introduce a variety of properties that “reasonable”
vulnerabilities might be expected to have in terms of axioms,
and study their consequences.
In Section IV we focus on the prior case and give axioms
for prior vulnerabilities 𝕍 alone. We then show that taking
convexity and continuity as our generic properties results in 𝑔-
vulneraibility exactly. Then, in Section V, we turn our attention
to axioms considering either both 𝕍 and ?ˆ?, or posterior ?ˆ?
alone. Moreover we study two ways of constructing ?ˆ? from
𝕍 and show that, in each case, several of the axioms become
equivalent.
Note that the axioms purely affect the relationship between
prior and posterior vulnerabilities, and are orthogonal to the
way 𝕍 and ?ˆ? are compared to measure leakage (e.g., multi-
plicatively or additively). Moreover, although in this paper we
consider axioms for vulnerability, dual axioms can be naturally
stated for generic uncertainty measures.
Table I summarizes the notation used through the paper,
while Table II summarizes the axioms we consider.
IV. AXIOMATIZATION OF PRIOR VULNERABILITIES
We now introduce axioms that deal solely with prior vul-
nerabilities 𝕍.
Axioms for prior vulnerabilities
CNTY ∀𝜋: 𝕍 is a continuous function of 𝜋
CVX ∀∑𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋𝑖: 𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
) ≤ ∑𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝕍(𝜋𝑖)
Q-CVX ∀∑𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋𝑖: 𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
) ≤ max𝑖 𝕍(𝜋𝑖)
Axioms for posterior vulnerabilities
NI ∀𝜋: ?ˆ?[𝜋] = 𝕍(𝜋)
DPI ∀𝜋,𝐶,𝑅: ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] ≥ ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅]
MONO ∀𝜋,𝐶: ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] ≥ 𝕍(𝜋)
Possible definitions of posterior vulnerabilities
AVG ∀Δ: ?ˆ?Δ = ExpΔ 𝕍
MAX ∀Δ: ?ˆ?Δ = max⌈Δ⌉ 𝕍
TABLE II: Summary of axioms for pairs of prior/posterior
vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?).
Continuity (CNTY). A vulnerability 𝕍 is a continuous
function of 𝜋 (w.r.t. the standard topology on 𝔻𝒳 ).
The CNTY axiom imposes that “small” changes on the
prior 𝜋 should have a “small” effect on 𝕍. This formalizes
the intuition that the adversary should not be infinitely risk-
averse. For instance, the non-continuous function 𝕍(𝜋) =
(1 if max𝑥 𝜋𝑥 ≥ 𝜆 else 0) would correspond to an adversary
who requires the probability of guessing to be above a certain
threshold in order to consider an attack effective. But this
is an arguably unnatural behavior, the risk of changing the
probability to 𝜆−𝜖, for an infinitesimal 𝜖, should not be
arbitrarily large.
A convex combination of priors 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑛 is a sum∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖 where 𝑎𝑖’s are non-negative reals adding up to 1.
Since 𝔻𝒳 is a convex set, a convex combination of priors is
itself a prior.
Convexity (CVX). A vulnerability 𝕍 is a convex function
of 𝜋, that is for all convex combinations
∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖:
𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
) ≤ ∑𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝕍(𝜋𝑖) .
This axiom can be interpreted as follows: imagine a “game” in
which a secret (say a password) is drawn from two possible
distributions 𝜋1 or 𝜋2. The choice of distributions is itself
random: we first select 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} at random, with 𝑖 = 1
having probability 𝑎1 and 𝑖 = 2 probability 𝑎2 = 1− 𝑎1, and
then use 𝜋𝑖 to draw the secret.
Now consider the following two scenarios for this game: in
the first scenario, the value of 𝑖 is given to the adversary,
so the actual prior the secret was drawn from is known.
Using the information in 𝜋𝑖 the adversary performs an attack,
the expected success of which is measured by 𝕍(𝜋𝑖), so the
expected measure of success overall will be
∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝕍(𝜋
𝑖).
In the second scenario, 𝑖 is not disclosed to the adversary,
who only knows that, on average, secrets are drawn from
the prior
∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
, hence the expected success of an attack
will be measured by 𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
)
. CVX corresponds to the
intuition that, since in the first scenario the adversary has more
information, the effectiveness of an attack can only be higher.
Note that, in the definition of CVX, it is sufficient to use
convex combinations of two priors, i.e., of the form 𝑎𝜋1 +
(1 − 𝑎)𝜋2; we often use such combinations in proofs. Note
also that CVX actually implies continuity everywhere except on
the boundary of the domain, i.e., on priors having an element
with probability exactly 0. CNTY explicitly requires continuity
everywhere.
Since the vulnerabilities 𝕍(𝜋𝑖) in the definition of CVX are
weighted by the probabilities 𝑎𝑖, we could have cases when
the expected vulnerability
∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝕍(𝜋
𝑖) is small although some
individual 𝕍(𝜋𝑖) is large. In such cases, one might argue
that the bound imposed by CVX is too strict and could be
loosened by requiring that 𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
)
is only bounded by
the maximum of the individual vulnerabilities. This weaker
requirement is called quasiconvexity.
Quasiconvexity (Q-CVX). A vulnerability 𝕍 is a quasicon-
vex function of 𝜋, that is for all
∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖:
𝕍
(∑
𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑖
) ≤ max
𝑖
𝕍(𝜋𝑖) .
In Section V we show that CVX and Q-CVX can be in
fact obtained as consequences of fundamental axioms relating
prior and posterior vulnerabilities, and specific choices for
constructing ?ˆ?.
In the remainder of this section we show that the vulner-
ability functions satisfying CNTY and CVX are exactly those
expressible as 𝑉𝑔 for some gain function 𝑔. We treat each
direction separately; full proofs are given in Appendix A.
A. 𝑉𝑔 satisfies CNTY and CVX
We first show that any 𝑔-vulnerability satisfies CNTY and
CVX. Let 𝒲 be a possibly infinite set of guesses and 𝑔:𝒲 ×
𝒳 → ℝ be a gain function. We start by expressing 𝑉𝑔 as the
supremum of a family of functions:
𝑉𝑔(𝜋) = sup
𝑤
𝑔𝑤(𝜋), where 𝑔𝑤(𝜋) =
∑
𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥) .
Intuitively, 𝑔𝑤 gives the expected gain for the specific guess
𝑤, as a function of 𝜋. Note that 𝑔𝑤 is linear on 𝜋, hence both
(trivially) convex and continuous.
The convexity of 𝑉𝑔 then follows from the fact that the sup
of any family of convex functions is itself a convex function.
On the other hand, showing continuity is more challenging,
since the supremum of continuous functions is not necessarily
continuous itself.
To show that 𝑉𝑔 is continuous, we employ the concept of
semi-continuity. Informally speaking, a function is upper (resp.
lower) semi-continuous at 𝑥0 if, for values close to 𝑥0, the
function is either close to 𝑓(𝑥0) or less than 𝑓(𝑥0) (resp.
greater than 𝑓(𝑥0)).
Lower semi-continuity is obtained from the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. If 𝑓 is the supremum of a family of continuous
functions then it is lower semi-continuous.
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Fig. 1: Supporting hyperplanes on different priors
On the other hand, upper semi-continuity follows from
the structure of the probability simplex and the Gale-Klee-
Rockafellar theorem:
Theorem 3 (Gale-Klee-Rockafellar, [14]). If 𝑓 is convex and
its domain is a polyhedron then it is upper semi-continuous.
Hence, 𝑉𝑔 is both lower semi-continuous (as the supremum
of continuous functions) and upper semi-continuous (it is
convex and 𝔻𝒳 is a polyhedron), and any function satisfying
both semi-continuities is necessarily continuous.
Corollary 4. Any 𝑔-vulnerability 𝑉𝑔 satisfies CNTY, CVX.
B. CNTY and CVX exactly characterize 𝑉𝑔
Gain functions and 𝑔-vulnerability were introduced in [5],
[6] in order to capture a variety of operational scenarios.
Besides naturally retrieving Bayes-vulnerability as a special
case, the flexibility of 𝑔-vulnerability allows us to retrieve
other well-known entropy measures, such as Shannon- and
guessing-entropy, using properly constructed gain functions
[11], [12]. This suggests the question of how expressive 𝑔-
vulnerabilities are in general.
Remarkably, it turns out that 𝑔-vulnerabilities are expressive
enough to capture any vulnerability function 𝕍 satisfying
CNTY and CVX, although in the general case a countably
infinite set 𝒲 of guesses might be needed.
Theorem 5. Let 𝕍 : 𝔻𝒳 → ℝ+ be a vulnerability function
satisfying CNTY and CVX. Then there exists a gain function 𝑔
with a countable number of guesses such that 𝕍 = 𝑉𝑔 .
The full proof is given in Appendix A; in the remainder
of this section we try to convey the main arguments. A
geometric view of gain functions is very helpful. Recall that
𝑔𝑤(𝜋), expressing the expected gain of a fixed guess 𝑤, is a
linear function of 𝜋. A crucial observation is that the graph
of 𝑔𝑤, that is the set of vectors {(𝜋, 𝑔𝑤(𝜋)) ∣ 𝜋 ∈ 𝔻𝒳},
forms a hyperplane. Moreover, it can be shown that any such
hyperplane6 can be obtained as the graph of 𝑔𝑤 by properly
choosing the gains 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥).
The correspondence between 𝑔𝑤 and hyperplanes allows us
to employ the supporting hyperplane theorem, which states
that for any point 𝑠 at the boundary of a convex set 𝑆, there
is a hyperplane passing through 𝑠 and leaving the whole set
6To be precise, only the hyperplanes not orthogonal to that of probability
distributions: see the full proof for details.
𝑆 on the same half space. Since 𝕍 is a convex function, its
epigraph epi𝕍 = {(𝜋, 𝑦) ∣ 𝑦 ≥ 𝕍(𝜋)} is a convex set. Given
any prior 𝜋∗, the point (𝜋∗,𝕍(𝜋∗)) lies on the boundary of
epi𝕍 hence there is a hyperplane passing from this point such
that 𝕍 lies above the hyperplane. Supporting hyperplanes on
different priors are illustrated in Figure 1.
Since such a hyperplane can be constructed for each prior,
we are going to use priors as guesses, making 𝒲 = 𝔻𝒳 .
For a guess 𝑤 ∈ 𝔻𝒳 we choose the gains 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥) such that
the graph of 𝑔𝑤 is exactly the supporting hyperplane passing
through (𝑤,𝕍(𝑤)). Since 𝕍 lies above the hyperplane, we get:
𝑔𝑤(𝜋) = 𝕍(𝜋) for 𝑤 = 𝜋 , and
𝑔𝑤(𝜋) ≤ 𝕍(𝜋) for all 𝜋 ∈ 𝔻𝒳 .
Finally, from the definition of 𝑉𝑔 we have that
𝑉𝑔(𝜋) = sup
𝑤∈𝔻𝒳
𝑔𝑤(𝜋) = 𝕍(𝜋) .
The restriction to a countable set of guesses can be obtained
by limiting 𝑤 to priors with rational elements, and using the
continuity of 𝑉𝑔 . The details can be found in Appendix A.
V. AXIOMATIZATION OF POSTERIOR VULNERABILITIES
In this section we consider axioms for posterior vulnerabil-
ities and axioms that relate posterior and prior vulnerabilities.
We investigate how different definitions of posterior vulner-
abilities shape the interrelation among these postulates. We
consider the following three axioms.
Non-interference (NI). The vulnerability of a point-hyper
equals the vulnerability of the unique inner of this hyper:
∀𝜋: ?ˆ?[𝜋] = 𝕍(𝜋) .
This axiom means that an adversary who has learned with
certainty that the secret follows distribution 𝜋 has the same
amount of information 𝕍(𝜋) one would have had from 𝜋 itself.
This postulate can also be interpreted in terms of non-
interference. A channel 𝐶NI is non-interfering if the result
of pushing any prior 𝜋 through 𝐶NI is the point-hyper [𝜋],
meaning that the adversary’s state of knowledge is never
changed by the observation of the output of the channel. It
is well known that a channel 𝐶𝑁𝐼 is non-interfering iff all its
rows are the same (see, for instance, [15]), so the simplest
non-interfering channel is the null-channel, denoted here by
0¯, with only one column (i.e., every secret yields the same
output). It can be easily verified that every non-interfering
channel 𝐶NI is equivalent to 0¯, since [𝜋,𝐶NI ] = [𝜋, 0¯] = [𝜋].
The NI axiom, then, is equivalent to stating that an adversary
observing the output of a non-interfering channel does not gain
or lose any information about the secret:
∀𝜋: ?ˆ?[𝜋, 0¯] = 𝕍(𝜋) .
Data-processing inequality (DPI). Post-processing does
not increase vulnerability:7
∀𝜋,𝐶,𝑅: ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] ≥ ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅] ,
7The data-processing inequality is a well well-known property of Shan-
non mutual information [16]: if 𝑋→𝑌→𝑍 forms a Markov chain, then
𝐼(𝑋;𝑌 ) ≥ 𝐼(𝑋;𝑍).
where the number of columns in matrix 𝐶 is the same as the
number of rows in matrix 𝑅.
This axiom can be interpreted as follows. Consider that a
secret is fed into a channel 𝐶, and the produced output is, then,
post-processed by being fed into another channel 𝑅 (naturally
the input domain of 𝑅 must be the same as the output domain
of 𝐶). Now consider two adversaries 𝐴 and 𝐴′ such that 𝐴
can only observe the output of channel 𝐶, and 𝐴′ can only
observe the output of the cascade 𝐶 ′ = 𝐶𝑅. For any given
prior 𝜋 on secret values, 𝐴’s posterior knowledge about the
secret is given by the hyper [𝜋,𝐶], whereas that of 𝐴′’s is
given by [𝜋,𝐶 ′]. Note, however, that from 𝐴’s knowledge it
is always possible to reconstruct 𝐴′’s, but the converse is not
necessarily true.8 Given this asymmetry, DPI formalizes that
a vulnerability ?ˆ? should not evaluate 𝐴’s information as any
less than 𝐴′’s.
Monotonicity (MONO). Pushing a prior through a channel
does not decrease vulnerability:
∀𝜋,𝐶: ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] ≥ 𝕍(𝜋) .
One interpretation for this axiom is that by observing the
output of a channel an adversary cannot lose information
about the secret; in the worst case, the output can be ignored
if it is not useful.9 A direct consequence of this axiom is
that, since posterior vulnerabilities are always greater than the
corresponding prior vulnerabilities, additive and multiplicative
versions of leakage as defined in Equations (2) and (3) are
always non-negative.
Having presented the three axioms of NI, DPI and MONO,
we discuss next how posterior vulnerabilities can be defined
so to respect them. Differently from the case of prior vulner-
abilities, in which the axioms considered (CVX and CNTY)
were sufficient to determine 𝑔-vulnerabilities as the unique
family of prior-measures that satisfy them, our axioms for
posterior vulnerabilities do not determine explicitly a unique
family of posterior vulnerabilities ?ˆ?. In the following sections
we consider alternative definitions of posterior vulnerabilities
and discuss the interrelation of the axioms they induce.
A. Posterior vulnerability as expectation
As seen in Section II, the posterior versions of Shannon-,
guessing-, and min-entropy, as well as of 𝑔-vulnerability,
are all defined as the expectation of the corresponding prior
measures applied to each posterior distribution, weighted by
the probability of each posterior’s being realized. We will now
consider the consequences of taking as an axiom the definition
of posterior vulnerability as expectation.
8𝐴 can use 𝜋 and 𝐶 to compute [𝜋,𝐶𝑅′] for any 𝑅′, including the
particular 𝑅 used by 𝐴′. On the other hand, 𝐴′ only knows 𝜋 and 𝐶′, and in
general the decomposition of 𝐶′ into a cascade of two channels is not unique
(i.e., there may be several pairs 𝐶𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 of matrices satisfying 𝐶′ = 𝐶𝑖𝑅𝑖), so
it is not always possible for 𝐴′ to uniquely recover 𝐶 from 𝐶′ and compute
[𝜋,𝐶].
9This axiom is a generalization of Shannon-entropy’s “information can’t
hurt” property [16]: 𝐻(𝑋 ∣ 𝑌 ) ≤ 𝐻(𝑋), for all random variables 𝑋 , 𝑌 .
(a) Defining ˆ𝕍 as AVG (b) Defining ˆ𝕍 as MAX
Fig. 2: Equivalence of axioms. The merging arrows indicate
joint implication: for example, on the left-hand side we have
that MONO+ AVG imply CVX.
Averaging (AVG). The vulnerability of a hyper is the
expected value, with respect to the outer distribution, of the
vulnerabilities of its inners:
∀Δ: ?ˆ?Δ = ExpΔ 𝕍 ,
where the hyper Δ:𝔻2𝒳 might result from Δ=[𝜋,𝐶] for some
𝜋, 𝐶.
The main results of this section consist in demonstrating
that by imposing AVG on a prior/posterior pair (𝕍, ?ˆ?) of
vulnerabilities, NI too is necessarily satisfied for this pair,
and, furthermore, the axioms of CVX, DPI and MONO become
equivalent to each other. Figure 2a illustrates these results.
Proposition 6 (AVG ⇒ NI). If a pair of prior/posterior
vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies AVG, then it also satisfies NI.
Proof: If AVG is assumed, for any prior 𝜋 it is the case that
?ˆ?[𝜋] = Exp[𝜋]𝕍 = 𝕍(𝜋), since [𝜋] is a point-hyper.
Proposition 7 (NI + DPI ⇒ MONO). If a pair of
prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies NI and DPI,
then it also satisfies MONO.
Proof: For any 𝜋, 𝐶, let 0¯ denote the non-interfering channel
with only one column and as many rows as the columns of
𝐶. Then
?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶]
≥ ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶0¯] (by DPI)
= ?ˆ?[𝜋, 0¯] (𝐶0¯ = 0¯)
= ?ˆ?[𝜋] (since 0¯ has only one column)
= 𝕍(𝜋) (by NI)
Proposition 8 (AVG + MONO ⇒ CVX). If a pair of
prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies AVG and MONO,
then it also satisfies CVX.
Proof: Let 𝒳 = {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛} be a finite set, and let 𝜋1 and
𝜋2 be distributions over 𝒳 . Let 0≤𝑎≤1, so that also 𝜋3 =
𝑎𝜋1 + (1−𝑎)𝜋2 is a distribution on 𝒳 . Define 𝐶∗ to be the
channel matrix
𝐶∗ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑎𝜋11/𝜋31 (1−𝑎)𝜋
2
1/𝜋31
.
.
.
.
.
.
𝑎𝜋1𝑖/𝜋3𝑖 (1−𝑎)𝜋
2
𝑖/𝜋3𝑖
.
.
.
.
.
.
𝑎𝜋1𝑛/𝜋3𝑛 (1−𝑎)𝜋
2
𝑛/𝜋3𝑛
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (4)
By pushing 𝜋3 through 𝐶∗ we obtain the hyper [𝜋3, 𝐶∗]
with outer distribution (𝑎, 1−𝑎), and associated inners 𝜋1 and
𝜋2. Since AVG is assumed, we have
?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶∗] = 𝑎𝕍(𝜋1) + (1−𝑎)𝕍(𝜋2) . (5)
But note that by MONO, we also have
?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶∗] ≥ 𝕍(𝜋3) = 𝕍(𝑎𝜋1 + (1−𝑎)𝜋2) . (6)
Taking (5) and (6) together, we obtain CVX.
For our next result, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let 𝑋→𝑌→𝑍 form a Markov chain with triply
joint distribution 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑥)𝑝(𝑦∣𝑥)𝑝(𝑧∣𝑦) for all
(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝒳×𝒴×𝒵 . Then ∑𝑦 𝑝(𝑦∣𝑧)𝑝(𝑥∣𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑥∣𝑧) for
all 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧.
Proof: First we note that the probability of 𝑧 depends only
on the probability of 𝑦, and not 𝑥, so 𝑝(𝑧∣𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑧∣𝑦) for
all 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧. Then we can use the fact that
𝑝(𝑦, 𝑧)𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑝(𝑦) (7)
to derive:∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑦∣𝑧)𝑝(𝑥∣𝑦)
=
∑
𝑦
𝑝(𝑦,𝑧)𝑝(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑝(𝑧)𝑝(𝑦)
=
∑
𝑦
𝑝(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)𝑝(𝑦)
𝑝(𝑧)𝑝(𝑦) (by Equation (7))
=
∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦∣𝑧)
= 𝑝(𝑥∣𝑧)
Proposition 10 (AVG + CVX ⇒ DPI). If a pair of
prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies AVG and CVX,
then it also satisfies DPI.
Proof: Let 𝒳 , 𝒴 and 𝒵 be sets of values. Let be 𝜋 be a prior
on 𝒳 , 𝐶 be a channel from 𝒳 to 𝒴 , and 𝑅 be a channel from
𝒴 to 𝒵 . Note that the cascading 𝐶𝑅 of channels 𝐶 and 𝑅 is
a channel from 𝒳 to 𝒵 .
Let 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) be the triply joint distribution defined as
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝜋𝑥𝐶𝑥,𝑦𝑅𝑦,𝑧 for all (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝒳×𝒴×𝒵 . By
construction, this distribution has the special Markov property
that the probability of 𝑧 depends only on the probability of 𝑦,
and not 𝑥. Thus 𝑝(𝑧 ∣ 𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑧 ∣ 𝑦).
Note that, by pushing prior 𝜋 through channel 𝐶, we obtain
hyper [𝜋,𝐶], in which the outer distribution on 𝑦 is 𝑝(𝑦), and
the inners are 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦 . Thus we can derive:
?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶]
=
∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑦)𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦) (by AVG)
=
∑
𝑦 (
∑
𝑧 𝑝(𝑧)𝑝(𝑦 ∣ 𝑧))𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦)
=
∑
𝑧 𝑝(𝑧)
∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑦 ∣ 𝑧)𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦)
≥ ∑𝑧 𝑝(𝑧)𝕍(∑𝑦 𝑝(𝑦 ∣ 𝑧)𝑝𝑋∣𝑦) (by CVX)
=
∑
𝑧 𝑝(𝑧)𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑧) (by Lemma 9)
= ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅] (by AVG)
Appendix B provides a concrete illustration of Proposition 10.
B. Posterior vulnerability as maximum
An important consequence of AVG is that an observable
happening with very small probability will have a negligible
effect on ?ˆ?, even if it completely reveals the secret. If such
a scenario is not acceptable, an alternative approach is to
consider the maximum information that may be obtained from
any single output of the channel—produced with non-zero
probability—no matter how small this probability is. This
conservative approach is employed, for instance, in the original
definition of differential-privacy [17].
We shall now consider the consequences of taking the
following definition of ?ˆ? as an axiom.
Maximum (MAX). The vulnerability of a hyper is the
maximum of the vulnerabilities of the inners in its support:
∀Δ: ?ˆ?Δ = max
⌈Δ⌉
𝕍 ,
where the hyper Δ:𝔻2𝒳 might result from Δ=[𝜋,𝐶] for some
𝜋, 𝐶.
The first result below shows that by imposing MAX on a
prior/posterior pair (𝕍, ?ˆ?) of vulnerabilities, NI is too satisfied
for this pair.
Proposition 11. [MAX ⇒ NI] If a pair of prior/posterior
vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies MAX, then it also satisfies NI.
Proof: If MAX is assumed, for any prior 𝜋 we will have
?ˆ?[𝜋] = max⌈[𝜋]⌉𝕍 = 𝕍(𝜋), since [𝜋] is a point-hyper.
However, in contrast to the case of AVG, the symmetry
among CVX, MONO and DPI is broken under MAX: although
the axioms of MONO and DPI are still equivalent (shown later
in this section, see Figure 2b), they are weaker than the axiom
of CVX. This is demonstrated by the following example, show-
ing a pair of prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfying
MAX, MONO and DPI but not CVX.
Example 12 (MAX+MONO+DPI ∕⇒ CVX). Consider the pair
(𝕍1, ?ˆ?1) such that for every prior 𝜋 and channel 𝐶:
𝕍1(𝜋) = 1−
(
min
𝑥
𝜋𝑥
)2
, and
?ˆ?1[𝜋,𝐶] = max⌈[𝜋,𝐶]⌉
𝕍1.
To see that 𝕍1 does not satisfy CVX, consider distributions
𝜋1 = (0, 1) and 𝜋2(1/2, 1/2), and its convex combination 𝜋3 =
1/2𝜋1+1/2𝜋2 = (1/4, 3/4). We calculate 𝕍1(𝜋1) = 1−02 = 1,
𝕍1(𝜋
2) = 1 − (1/2)2 = 3/4, 𝕍1(𝜋3) = 1 − (1/4)2 = 15/16,
and 1/2𝕍1(𝜋1) + 1/2𝕍(𝜋2) = 7/8 to conclude that 𝕍1(𝜋3) >
1/2𝕍1(𝜋
1) + 1/2𝕍1(𝜋
2) and, hence, CVX is not satisfied.
The pair (𝕍1, ?ˆ?1) satisfies MAX by construction. To show
that it satisfies MONO and DPI, we first notice that 𝕍1 is
quasiconvex. Using results from Figure 2b (proved later in this
section), we conclude that MONO and DPI are also satisfied.
The vulnerability function used in the counter-example
above is quasiconvex. It turns out that this is not a coincidence:
by replacing CVX with Q-CVX (a weaker property), the
symmetry between the axioms can be restored. The remaining
of this section establishes the equivalence of Q-CVX, MONO
and DPI under MAX, as illustrated in Figure 2b.
Proposition 13. [MAX + MONO ⇒ Q-CVX] If a pair of
prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies MAX and MONO,
then it also satisfies Q-CVX.
Proof: By contradiction, let us assume that (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfy
MAX and MONO, but does not satisfy Q-CVX.
Since Q-CVX is not satisfied, there must exist a value 0 ≤
𝑎 ≤ 1 and three distributions 𝜋1, 𝜋2, 𝜋3, such that 𝜋3 =
𝑎𝜋1 + (1− 𝑎)𝜋2 and
𝕍(𝜋3) > max (𝕍(𝜋1),𝕍(𝜋2)) . (8)
Consider the channel 𝐶∗ defined as in Equation (4). Then
the hyper-distribution [𝜋3, 𝐶∗] has outer distribution (𝑎, 1−𝑎),
and corresponding inner distributions 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. Since MAX
is assumed, we have that
?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶∗] = max (𝕍(𝜋1),𝕍(𝜋2)) , (9)
and because we assumed MONO, we also have that
?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶∗] ≥ 𝕍(𝜋3) . (10)
Equations (9) and (10) give 𝕍(𝜋3) ≤ max (𝕍(𝜋1),𝕍(𝜋2)),
which contradicts our assumption in Equation (8).
Proposition 14. [MAX + Q-CVX ⇒ DPI] If a pair
of prior/posterior vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies MAX and
Q-CVX, then it also satisfies DPI.
Proof: Let 𝜋 be a prior on 𝒳 , and 𝐶, 𝑅 be channels
from 𝒳 to 𝒴 and from 𝒴 to 𝒵 , respectively, with joint
distribution 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) defined in the same way as in the proof
of Proposition 10.
Note that, by pushing prior 𝜋 through channel 𝐶𝑅, we
obtain hyper [𝜋,𝐶𝑅] in which the outer distribution on 𝑧 is
𝑝(𝑧), and the inner are 𝑝𝑋∣𝑧 . Thus we can derive:
?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅]
= max𝑧 𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑧) (by MAX)
= max𝑧 𝕍
(∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑦 ∣ 𝑧)𝑝𝑋∣𝑦
)
(by Lemma 9)
≤ max𝑧
(
max𝑦 𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦)
)
(by Q-CVX)
= max𝑦 𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦)
= ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] (by MAX)
Finally, note that, although Q-CVX is needed to recover the
full equivalence of the axioms, CVX is strictly stronger than
Q-CVX; hence, using a convex vulnerability measure (such as
any 𝑉𝑔), MONO and DPI are still guaranteed under MAX.
Corollary 15. [MAX+CVX⇒ MONO+DPI] If a pair (𝕍, ?ˆ?)
satisfies MAX and CVX, then it also satisfies MONO and DPI.
Proof: Using the results of Figure 2b and the fact that
CVX⇒ Q-CVX.
C. Other definitions of posterior vulnerabilities
In this section we explore the consequences of constraining
posterior vulnerability more loosely than explicitly defining it
as AVG or MAX. We require only that the posterior vulnerability
cannot be greater than the vulnerability resulting from the
most-informative channel output, nor less than the vulnera-
bility resulting from the least-informative channel output.
Bounds (BNDS). The vulnerability of a hyper lies between
the minimum and the maximum of the vulnerabilities of the
inners in its support:
∀Δ: min
⌈Δ⌉
𝕍 ≤ ?ˆ?Δ ≤ max
⌈Δ⌉
𝕍 ,
where the hyper Δ:𝔻2𝒳 might result from Δ=[𝜋,𝐶] for some
𝜋, 𝐶.
The next results show that, whereas BNDS is strong enough
to ensure NI (Proposition 16), by replacing MAX with BNDS,
the equivalence among Q-CVX, DPI and MONO no longer
holds (Example 12).
Proposition 16 (BNDS ⇒ NI). If a pair of prior/posterior
vulnerabilities (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies BNDS, then it also satisfies NI.
Proof: If (𝕍, ?ˆ?) satisfies BNDS, then min⌈Δ⌉ 𝕍 ≤ ?ˆ?Δ ≤
max⌈Δ⌉ 𝕍 for every hyper Δ. Consider, then, the particular
case when Δ = [𝜋]. Since [𝜋] is a point-hyper with inner 𝜋,
we have that min⌈[𝜋]⌉𝕍 = max⌈[𝜋]⌉𝕍 = 𝕍(𝜋). This in turn
implies that 𝕍(𝜋) ≤ ?ˆ?[𝜋] ≤ 𝕍(𝜋), which is NI.
The next example shows that under BNDS, not even CVX—
which is stronger than Q-CVX—is sufficient to ensure MONO
or DPI.
Example 17 (BNDS + CVX ∕⇒ MONO or DPI). Consider the
pair (𝕍2, ?ˆ?2) such that for every prior 𝜋 and hyper Δ:
𝕍2(𝜋) = max
𝑥
𝜋𝑥, and
?ˆ?2Δ = (max⌈Δ⌉ 𝕍2+min⌈Δ⌉ 𝕍2)/2.
The pair (𝕍2, ?ˆ?2) satisfies BNDS, since ?ˆ?2 is the simple
arithmetic average of maximum and minimum vulnerabilities
of the inners. The pair (𝕍2, ?ˆ?2) also satisfies CVX, since
𝕍2(𝜋) is just the Bayes vulnerability of 𝜋.
To see that the pair (𝕍2, ?ˆ?2) does not satisfy MONO,
consider prior 𝜋2 = (9/10, 1/10) and channel
𝐶2 =
8/9 1/9
0 1
.
We can calculate that 𝕍2(𝜋2) = 9/10, and that [𝜋2, 𝐶2] has
outer distribution (4/5, 1/5), and inner distributions (1, 0) and
(1/2, 1/2). Hence
?ˆ?2[𝜋
2, 𝐶2] = (1+1/2)/2 = 3/4 ,
which violates MONO because ?ˆ?2[𝜋2, 𝐶2] < 𝕍2(𝜋2).
Now to see that the pair (𝕍2, ?ˆ?2) does not satisfy DPI,
consider the prior 𝜋3 = (3/7, 4/7) and the channels
𝐶3 =
1/3 2/3
1/4 3/4
and 𝑅3 =
1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4
.
We can calculate that [𝜋3, 𝐶3] has outer distribution (2/7, 5/7),
and inners (1/2, 1/2) and (2/5, 3/5). Hence
?ˆ?2[𝜋
3, 𝐶3] = (1/2+3/5)/2 = 11/20 = 0.55 .
On the other hand, the cascade 𝐶3𝑅3 yields the channel
𝐶3𝑅3 =
7/12 5/12
5/8 3/8
,
and we can calculate [𝜋3, 𝐶3𝑅3] to have outer distribution
(17/28, 11/28), and inners (7/17, 10/17) and (5/11, 6/11). Hence
?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶3𝑅3] = (10/17+6/11)/2 = 106/187 ≈ 0.567 ,
which makes ?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶3𝑅3] > ?ˆ?[𝜋3, 𝐶3], violating DPI.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we briefly discuss two applications of the
results in Sections IV and V, showing how they can help to
clarify the multitude of possible leakage measures.
One application concerns Re´nyi entropy [8], a family of
entropy measures defined by
𝐻𝛼(𝜋) =
1
1− 𝛼 lg
(∑
𝑥∈𝒳 𝜋
𝛼
𝑥
)
for 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ ∞ (taking limits in the cases of 𝛼 = 1, which
gives Shannon entropy, and 𝛼 =∞, which gives min-entropy).
It would be natural to use Re´nyi entropy to define a family
of leakage measures by defining posterior Re´nyi entropy ?ˆ?𝛼
using AVG and defining Re´nyi leakage by
ℒ𝛼(𝜋,𝐶) = 𝐻𝛼(𝜋)− ?ˆ?𝛼[𝜋,𝐶] .
However, it turns out that 𝐻𝛼 is not concave for 𝛼 > 2.
Therefore, by the dual version of Proposition 8, we find that
Re´nyi leakage ℒ𝛼 for 𝛼 > 2 would sometimes be negative. As
an illustration, Figure 3 shows how the nonconcavity of min-
entropy 𝐻∞ can cause posterior min-entropy to be greater than
prior min-entropy, giving negative min-entropy leakage.10
A second application concerns the robustness of the compo-
sition refinement relation ⊑∘ studied in [5], [6], [13]. Given
channels 𝐶 and 𝐷, both taking input 𝑋 , 𝐶 is composition
refined by 𝐷, written 𝐶 ⊑∘ 𝐷, if 𝐷 = 𝐶𝑅 for some “refining”
channel 𝑅. As proved in [5], [13], composition refinement is
sound and complete for the strong 𝑔-leakage ordering: we
have 𝐶 ⊑∘ 𝐷 iff the 𝑔-leakage of 𝐷 never exceeds that of 𝐶,
regardless of the prior 𝜋 or gain function 𝑔. Still, we might
worry that composition refinement implies a leakage ordering
only with respect to 𝑔-leakage, leaving open the possibility that
the leakage ordering might conceivably fail for some yet-to-be
defined leakage measure. But our Propositions 8 and 10 show
10Note that min-entropy leakage, as defined in [4], does not in fact define
posterior min-entropy using AVG but instead by ?ˆ?∞[𝜋,𝐶] = − lg 𝑉 𝑏[𝜋,𝐶].
Fig. 3: A picture showing how posterior min-entropy can be
greater than prior min-entropy. Pushing prior 𝜋 = (1/3, 2/3)
through channel 𝐶 gives hyper [𝜋,𝐶] with outer (1/3, 2/3) and
inners 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦1 = (0, 1) and 𝑝𝑋∣𝑦2 = (1/2, 1/2). So 𝐻∞(𝜋) =
− lg 2/3 ≈ 0.58 and ?ˆ?∞[𝜋,𝐶] = 1/3 ⋅ 0 + 2/3 ⋅ 1 ≈ 0.67.
that if the hypothetical new leakage measure is defined using
AVG, and never gives negative leakage, then it also satisfies
the data-processing inequality DPI. And hence composition
refinement is also sound for the new leakage measure.
VII. A CATEGORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The axioms relating to Averaging are in fact instances of
the monad laws proved by Giry for probabilistic computation
[18], and in this section we give details. The benefit of this
more general view is that it provides immediate access to
well developed mathematical theories extending these results
to infinite states and proper measures [19]. And this categorical
perspective gives a direct connection to higher-order reasoning
tools that dramatically simplify proofs, thereby leading directly
to practical frameworks for calculating leakage [20].
The operator 𝔻 that takes a sample space 𝒳 to (discrete)
distributions 𝔻𝒳 on that space is widely recognised as the
“probability monad”, that is in effect a type constructor that
obeys a small collection of laws shared by other, similar
constructors like the powerset operator ℙ [18]. Each monad has
two polymorphic functions 𝜂, for “unit”, and 𝜇, for “multiply”,
that interact with each other in elegant ways. For example in
(the) ℙ (monad), unit has type 𝒳→ℙ𝒳 and 𝜂𝑥 is {𝑥}, the
singleton set containing just 𝑥; in 𝔻 we have type 𝒳→𝔻𝒳
and 𝜂𝑥 is [𝑥], the point-distribution on 𝑥. In ℙ, multiply 𝜇 is
distributed union that takes a set of sets to the one set that
is the union of them all, having thus the type ℙ2𝒳→ℙ𝒳 ;
and in 𝔻 we have (𝜇Δ)𝑥 =
∑
𝛿: ⌈Δ⌉ Δ𝛿𝛿𝑥, with 𝜇 thus of
type 𝔻2𝒳→𝔻𝒳 and taking the outer-weighted average of all
the inner distributions 𝛿 in the support of hyper Δ: it is the
“weighted average” of the hyper. This means, for example,
that 𝜇[𝜋,𝐶]=𝜋, i.e. that if you average the hyper produced by
prior 𝜋 and channel 𝐶 you get the prior back again.
Furthermore the monadic type-constructors are functors,
meaning they can be applied to functions as well as to objects:
thus for 𝑓 in 𝒳→𝒴 the function ℙ𝑓 of type ℙ𝒳→ℙ𝒴 is such
that for 𝑋 in ℙ𝒳 we have 𝑓(𝑋) = {𝑓(𝑥) ∣ 𝑥∈𝑋} in ℙ𝒴 . In
𝔻 instead we get the push forward of 𝑓 , so that for 𝜋 in 𝔻𝒳
we have (𝔻𝑓)(𝜋)𝑦 =
∑
𝑓(𝑥)=𝑦 𝜋𝑥.
With these tools, some of our axioms can be expressed in
a very general way, for example
(1) AVG becomes ?ˆ?=𝜇∘𝔻𝕍.
(2) NI becomes ?ˆ?∘𝜂=𝕍. Assuming (1), that follows from the
general monad laws 𝜇∘𝜂=1 and 𝔻𝑉 ∘𝜂=𝜂∘𝑉 .
(3) CVX becomes 𝕍∘𝜇 ≤ 𝜇∘𝔻𝕍.
A consequence of accepting averaging (1) is that
?ˆ?(Δ1𝑝+Δ
2) = ?ˆ?(Δ1) 𝑝+ ?ˆ?(Δ
2), i.e. linearity of ?ˆ?, where
𝑝+ takes the 𝑝-weighted sum of its operands: on the left we
sum over hypers; on the right we sum over scalars. This is
more generally ?ˆ?(𝜇Δ) = 𝜇((𝔻?ˆ?)Δ) where Δ is in 𝔻3𝒳 , a
distribution of hypers, another monad law when ?ˆ?=𝜇∘𝔻𝕍.
The space 𝔻3𝒳 also gives a hyper-formulated definition of
the secrecy order ⊑ over hypers, i.e., that Δ1⊑Δ2 just when
?ˆ?Δ1≥?ˆ?Δ2 for all ?ˆ? satisfying the axioms: it is that Δ1⊑Δ2
just when there is a Δ such that Δ1=𝜇Δ and Δ2=(𝔻𝜇)Δ
[19], [21]. This formulation allows soundness of ⊑, i.e. that it
can only decrease 𝑔-vulnerability, to be shown even for infinite
state-spaces 𝒳 and general measures. (See Appendix C.)
Finally, the monadic structure coupled with the Kantorovich
metric gives us continuity criteria not only for 𝕍 but also for ?ˆ?
[18], [22]. If we give the underlying 𝒳 the discrete metric, that
dist(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = (0 if 𝑥1=𝑥2 else 1), then the Kantorovich-
induced distance on 𝔻𝒳 is equivalent to the Manhattan metric,
the notion used in the axiom CNTY. But the great generality
of the monadic construction gives us that AVG, i.e., that
?ˆ? = 𝜇∘𝔻𝕍, makes ?ˆ? continuous as well, this time with
respect to the Kantorovich metric on hypers. That in turn
allows higher-order calculations that limit information flow in
a very robust way [11].
VIII. RELATED WORK
In [23] Csisza´r surveys the most commonly used postulates
for a function 𝑓 of the uncertainty contained in a finite
probability distribution (𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) for 𝑛>0. They are:
(P1) Positivity: 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) ≥ 0;
(P2) Expansibility: 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛, 0) = 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛);
(P3) Symmetry: 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) is invariant under permutations
of (𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛);
(P4) Continuity: 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) is a continuous function of
(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛), for fixed 𝑛;
(P5) Additivity: 𝑓(𝑃×𝑄) = 𝑓(𝑃 )+ 𝑓(𝑄), where 𝑃×𝑄 is the
product-distribution of 𝑃 and 𝑄 (i.e., the distribution in
which events have probability 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑗 for each 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 and
𝑞𝑗 ∈ 𝑄);
(P6) Subadditivity: 𝑓(𝐴,𝐵) ≤ 𝑓(𝐴) + 𝑓(𝐵), where 𝐴 and 𝐵
are discrete random variables;
(P7) Strong additivity: 𝑓(𝐴,𝐵) = 𝑓(𝐴) + 𝑓(𝐵∣𝐴);
(P8) Recursivity: 𝑓(𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) =
𝑓(𝑝1+𝑝2, 𝑝3, . . . , 𝑝𝑛)+(𝑝1+𝑝2)𝑓 (𝑝1/(𝑝1+𝑝2), 𝑝2/(𝑝1+𝑝2));
(P9) Sum-property: 𝑓(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) =
∑𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑔(𝑝𝑘) for some
function 𝑔.
Shannon-entropy is the only uncertainty measure to satisfy
all axioms (P1)-(P9) listed by Csisza´r; but in fact different
subsets of these axioms are sufficient to fully characterize
Shannon-entropy. In particular, Shannon himself showed that
continuity, strong additivity, and the property that the uncer-
tainty of a uniform distribution should not decrease as the
number of elements in the distribution increases, are sufficient
to determine entropy up to a constant factor [2]. Khinchin
proved a similar result using strong additivity, expansibility,
and the property that the maximum uncertainty should be
realized in a uniform distribution [7].
In [8] Re´nyi explored ways to relax the axiomatization of
Shannon-entropy to derive more general uncertainty measures.
He showed that Shannon entropy could be characterized
by five postulates: (R1) symmetry; (R2) continuity; (R3)
𝑓(1/2, 1/2) = 1; (R4) additivity; and (R5) the entropy of
the union of two incomplete distributions is the arithmetic
weighted average of each individual distribution. By replac-
ing the weighted average in postulate (R5) with the (more
relaxed) exponential mean, Re´nyi uniquely determined the
family of Re´nyi entropies for full probability distributions
𝐻𝛼(𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) = 1/(1−𝛼) lg(
∑𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑝
𝛼
𝑘 ), where 0<𝛼 ∕=1 is
a parameter. In the limit of 𝛼 tending to 1, 𝐻𝛼 coincides with
Shannon-entropy, and in the limit of 𝛼 tending to infinity, 𝐻𝛼
is min-entropy, a measure that turned out to be highly relevant
in the field quantitative information flow (QIF) [4].
Following Denning’s seminal work [24], Shannon-entropy
has been widely used in the field of QIF for the leakage of
confidential information [1], [25]–[30]. But as the field of QIF
evolved, new measures of uncertainty and of information have
been proposed. Contrary to Re´nyi’s motivation, however, most
measures were not derived from mathematical principles, but
instead were motivated by specific operational scenarios. Some
examples are guessing-entropy [3], min-vulnerability [4], [6],
[31], and 𝑔-vulnerability [5], to cite a few. Although many
“healthiness properties” have been proved for these measures
(e.g., non-negativity, non-decrease of uncertainty by post-
processing, etc.), there has not always been a derivation of such
measures from basic principles, or attempts to verify whether
they can be unified in a more general framework.
Naturally, since measures other than Shannon-entropy can-
not satisfy all postulates (P1)-(P9), the axioms for vulnerability
considered in this paper differ from those listed by Csisza´r.
Some differences are unimportant: they are just adaptations
of axioms of uncertainty to axioms of vulnerability (e.g.,
conditioning of random variables reduces uncertainty, but
increases vulnerability, so some inequalities must be reversed).
Other differences are, however, more fundamental, as they
reflect our departure from Shannon’s obliviousness to the
meaning of different secret values. The axiom of symmetry
(P3), for instance, assumes that all secret values are equally
informative, which is false in many scenarios: for instance, not
everyone’s bank account is as worth breaking in to as everyone
else’s—so evidently a permutation on the probabilities of
every particular account being broken into does not amount
to the same vulnerability. The axioms of additivity (P5),
subadditivity (P6) and strong additivity (P7) assume that the
uncertainty of a pair of joint random variables is a function
only of the correlation of the random variables, which is
also not a valid assumption in many security scenarios: the
information of the combination of two secrets may exceed
the information contents of each separate secret: for instance,
the benefit of knowing someone’s PIN-code and bank-account
number at the same time greatly surpasses the sum of the
benefits of knowing each separately. Recursivity (P8) and
sum-property (P9) assume that the probability of each secret
value contributes on equal terms to the overall uncertainty of
the probability distribution, which also is a false assumption
for many relevant measures. Bayes vulnerability, for instance,
satisfies neither recursivity nor the sum-property, as the in-
formation of a probability distribution is a function of the
maximum probability only.
Relation with Kifer and Lin’s work. Kifer and Lin’s work
is the one most closely related to ours. In a series of papers
[9], [32]–[34], these authors proposed an axiomatic charac-
terization of “good” properties that sanitization mechanisms
should provide, focusing in particular on privacy and utility
measures. They considered utility as information preservation,
which captures how “faithful” the output of the mechanism is
to its input,11 and as such is closely related to our notion
of vulnerability. This notion derives from the more general
concept of utility used in decision theory. Kifer and Lin argued
that utility has not been studied systematically in the context
of privacy, and that some proposals have led to inconsistencies
and paradoxes.
In the following we summarize the connection between our
paper and their work. We start by briefly recalling their basic
concepts and notation. A sanitization mechanism ℳ is a ran-
domized algorithm from inputs to outputs,12 whose behavior
is described by conditional probabilities 𝑃ℳ(𝑜∣𝑖) of observing
output 𝑜 when input is 𝑖. Such privacy mechanisms correspond
exactly to our channels. Given two mechanisms ℳ1 and ℳ2
and 𝑝 ∈ [0, 1], ℳ1⊕𝑝ℳ2 denotes the mechanism that, on
input 𝐷, returns ℳ1(𝐷) with probability 𝑝 and ℳ2(𝐷) with
probability 1−𝑝, and also reveals whether the output was
created using ℳ1 or ℳ2.
A measure of information preservation is a function 𝜇
mapping a mechanism ℳ to a real value. Lin and Kifer [9]
describe five axioms that such measures should satisfy:
(1) Sufficiency: 𝜇(ℳ) ≥ 𝜇(𝒜∘ℳ) for any randomized algo-
rithm 𝒜. Here ∘ represents functional composition.
(2) Continuity: 𝜇 is continuous in the components of ℳ
(viewed as a matrix).
(3) Branching: Given a mechanism ℳ with output space
{𝑜1, . . . 𝑜𝑛} there is a function 𝐺 such that 𝜇(ℳ) =
𝐺(𝑃ℳ(𝑜1∣⋅), 𝑃ℳ(𝑜2∣⋅))+𝜇(ℳ′), where ℳ′ is ob-
11This is in contrast with utility as usability, which expresses how easily the
output can be used. An example of the difference is provided by an encryption
mechanism, which perfectly preserves information, but whose output is not
usable except by users who know the decryption key.
12In Kifer and Lin’s work, the inputs of a mechanism are assumed to be
datasets, and denoted by 𝐷. However, the discussion of this section apply to
inputs and outputs of any kind.
tained from ℳ by adding together the columns
𝑃ℳ(𝑜1∣⋅), 𝑃ℳ(𝑜2∣⋅) and leaving the others unchanged.
(4) Quasi-convexity: 𝜇(ℳ1⊕𝑝ℳ2)≤max (𝜇(ℳ1), 𝜇(ℳ2)).
(5) Quasi-concavity: 𝜇(ℳ1⊕𝑝ℳ2)≥min (𝜇(ℳ1), 𝜇(ℳ2)) .
Lin and Kifer analyzed in [9] many popular measures of utility
from the literature of privacy, and showed that almost all of
them fail to satisfy the above axioms. One exception is the
notion of 𝑔-vulnerability, as we will see in a moment.
By observing that our notion of vulnerability is essentially
the utility of the adversary, we can make several connections
between Kifer and Lin’s principles and our own. First, their
sufficiency axiom is clearly related to our data-processing
inequality (DPI), since 𝒜∘ℳ represents the post-processing
of ℳ by 𝒜. Furthermore, they showed in [9] that Axioms (1)–
(3) characterize a measure based on posterior 𝑔-vulnerability.
More formally:13
Theorem 18 (Lin and Kifer [9], Theorem 6.2).
∙ ∀𝑔 ∀𝜋 ∃𝜇 satisf. (1)-(5) : ∀ℳ𝑉𝑔[𝜋,ℳ] = 𝜇(ℳ)
∙ ∀𝜇 satisf. (1)-(3)∃𝜋 ∃𝑔 : ∀ℳ𝑉𝑔[𝜋,ℳ] = 𝜇(ℳ)
From previous sections, we know that any function satis-
fying continuity (CNTY),14 convexity (CVX), and averaging
(AVG) corresponds to a posterior 𝑔-vulnerability for some 𝑔.
Together with the above result, this suggests a strong relation
between information preservation and the notion of average-
based posterior vulnerability explored in this paper.
However, there are important differences. First of all, the
type of 𝜇 and that of posterior vulnerability are different:
posterior vulnerability applies to a hyper-distribution, typically
derived from a channel ℳ and a prior 𝜋. On the other hand,
𝜇 applies only to a channel ℳ. This means that the prior
𝜋 is implicitly encoded into 𝜇, and that the utility 𝜇(ℳ) is
the utility of ℳ under the fixed prior 𝜋. A second (related)
difference is that, while we can express the prior vulnerability
as a particular case of posterior vulnerability, this is not the
case for 𝜇. In fact, we can express the utility of the distribution
𝜋 associated to 𝜇 as 𝜇(0¯), but we cannot express the utility
of a generic distribution via the same 𝜇. Indeed, because of
Axiom (1), for any ℳ, 𝜇(ℳ) has an utility greater than or
equal to that of 𝜇(0¯), thus it cannot represent the utility of any
𝜋′ that has less utility than 𝜋. As a consequence, it seems that
the relation between prior and posterior measures, which is a
major contribution of our paper, cannot be expressed in Kifer
and Lin’s framework. At least, not by using 𝜇 alone: one would
need to introduce and axiomatize a new function. In particular,
the averaging axiom (AVG) cannot be formulated by using 𝜇
alone. Similarly, the maximum (MAX) and the bounds (BNDS)
axioms cannot be formulated, despite the resemblance of the
latter with the axioms (4) and (5) above.
13Theorem 18 was actually formulated for the converse functions: the
information loss and the expected error of a Bayesian decision maker,
which are converse of the information preservation and of the posterior 𝑔-
vulnerability, respectively.
14Note that (CNTY) and (2) refer to different type of arguments.
In summary, a main novelty with respect to the work of
Kifer and Lin is that we investigate the relation between
prior and posterior vulnerabilities. Another novel contribution
is the study of the relationships between alternative sets of
axioms. In general, indeed, our focus is different from that of
Kifer and Lin: they focused on finding a collection of axioms
for analyzing utility specifically, and used them to review
the current practices in the field of privacy. In contrast, our
main motivation is to establish the scientific principles which
can help in the development or adaptation of new measures
in response to novel situations. Thus, we explored different
sets of possible axioms, thereby clarifying the implications
between the principles themselves.
Relation with Boreale and Pampaloni’s work. In [35],
[36], Boreale and Pampaloni have conducted one of the first
studies of adaptive adversaries in the context of quantitative
information flow. They did not consider explicitly an axiomatic
framework, but, in order for their results to be as general as
possible, they adopted a generic notion of entropy, specified by
a few properties which turn out to be our axioms of concavity,
continuity, and averaging. Furthermore, in [36] they pointed
out a known theorem in decision theory, which states that a
function 𝐻 : 𝔻𝒳 → ℝ+, satisfies concavity and continuity
iff it is of the form 𝐻(𝜋) =
∑
𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝑆(𝑥, 𝜋), where 𝑆 : 𝒳 ×
𝔻𝒳 → ℝ+, is any function which satisfies the condition that∑
𝑥 𝜋𝑥𝑆(𝑥, 𝜋
′) is minimal when 𝜋′ = 𝜋. Such function 𝑆,
called Proper Scoring Rule in decision theory, is similar to
the (converse of) gain functions used in 𝑔-vulnerability, and
therefore the above definition is related to that of prior 𝑔-
entropy. Thus this result is similar to that of the completeness
of 𝑔-vulnerability with respect to our axiomatization of the
prior vulnerability (Theorem 5).
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented axioms that might be satisfied by
intuitively reasonable measures of the prior- and posterior
vulnerability of a secret as it is being processed by a system:
this allowed us to derive properties of leakage. Our first
main contribution was (1) the equivalence of the axioms of
convexity, monotonicity (i.e. non-negativity of leakage), and
data-processing inequality (DPI) when posterior vulnerability
is defined as the average vulnerability of the posteriors, and
(2) the equivalence of quasiconvexity, monotonicity and DPI
when posterior vulnerability is defined as the worst-case
vulnerability of posterior distributions. A deep implication
of these results is that convexity (and quasiconvexity) of
information measures do not need to be taken as fundamental
properties, but are derivable from more intuitive principles,
such as averaging (or worst-case analysis) and DPI.
The second main contribution was the demonstration of
the soundness and completeness of 𝑔-vulnerabilities with
respect to the axioms of convexity and continuity. Moreover,
because of the equivalences we established, it follows that
𝑔-vulnerability exactly captures all average-based information
measures that respect DPI or monotonicity.
We now want to further investigate the full family of
vulnerabilities under quasiconvexity and continuity, character-
izing all worst-case based vulnerabilities that respect DPI or
monotonicity.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF TECHNICAL RESULTS.
A. Proofs of Section IV-A
The interior int(𝑆) of a set 𝑆 ⊆ ℝ𝑛 is the set of points
𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 such that their is some ball centered at 𝑥 which is
contained in 𝑆. The boundary of 𝑆 is bd(𝑆) = 𝑆 ∖ int(𝑆). A
set is called open if 𝑆 = int(𝑆) and closed if its complement
is open.
A function 𝑓 is upper (resp. lower) semi-continuous, if its
value around 𝑥0 is close to 𝑓(𝑥0) or less than (resp. greater
than) 𝑓(𝑥0). This can be formulated in terms of limits, but
a simpler equivalent definition is the following: 𝑓 is upper
semi-continuous if the set
{𝑥 ∣ 𝑓(𝑥) < 𝛼}
is open for all 𝛼 ∈ ℝ, and lower semi-continuous if the set
{𝑥 ∣ 𝑓(𝑥) > 𝛼} is open for all 𝛼 ∈ ℝ.
Proposition 2. If 𝑓 is the supremum of a family of continuous
functions then it is lower semi-continuous.
Proof: Let ℱ be a set of continuous functions and let 𝑓(𝑥) =
sup𝑓 ′∈ℱ 𝑓
′(𝑥). We show that 𝑓 is lower semi-continuous.
Fix some 𝛼 ∈ ℝ. We need to show that 𝐴 = {𝑥 ∣ 𝑓(𝑥) > 𝛼}
is open. Let 𝑥0 ∈ 𝐴; we are going to show that there exists
a ball around 𝑥0 contained in 𝐴. Since 𝛼 < sup𝑓 ′∈ℱ 𝑓 ′(𝑥0),
there exists some 𝑓 ′ ∈ ℱ such that 𝑓 ′(𝑥0) > 𝛼. Since 𝑓 ′ is
continuous, there exists some ball 𝐵𝜖(𝑥0) such that 𝑓 ′(𝑥) > 𝛼
for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝐵𝜖(𝑥0). Hence 𝑓(𝑥) ≥ 𝑓 ′(𝑥) > 𝛼 for all 𝑥 ∈
𝐵𝜖(𝑥0) which means that 𝐵𝜖(𝑥0) ⊆ 𝐴.
B. Proofs of Section IV-B
In this section we develop in full detail the line of reasoning
of Section IV-B, leading to the proof of Theorem 5.
We start with a geometric view of gain functions. A hyper-
plane is the set of vectors 𝑥 satisfying
𝑎 ⋅ 𝑥 = 𝑏
for some 𝑎 ∈ ℝ𝑛, 𝑎 ∕= 0 (the normal) and 𝑏 ∈ ℝ. The
hyperplane splits ℝ𝑛 into two closed half-spaces
𝑎 ⋅ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 and 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑥 ≥ 𝑏
A hyperplane supports a set 𝑆 if 𝑆 lies within of the two
closed half-spaces and at least one point lies on the hyperplane.
The supporting hyperplane theorem states that if 𝑆 is convex
and 𝑥 ∈ bd(𝑆) then there exists a supporting hyperplane that
contains 𝑥.
Geometrically, a guess 𝑤 can be thought of as a vector in
ℝ
𝑛
, for 𝑛 = ∣𝒳 ∣15 containing the loss for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝒳 . In this
case 𝑔𝑤 (giving the expected gain of a specific guess 𝑤) can
be simply expressed as the dot product:
𝑔𝑤(𝜋) = 𝜋 ⋅ 𝑤
For fixed 𝑤, the graph of 𝑔𝑤(𝜋) is a hyperplane on 𝔻𝒳 × ℝ
with parameters 𝑎 = (−𝑤, 1) and 𝑏 = 0, since
(−𝑤, 1) ⋅ (𝜋, 𝑦) = 0 ⇔ 𝑦 = 𝜋 ⋅ 𝑤
Conversely, any hyperplane on 𝔻𝒳 × ℝ of the form
(𝑎, 1) ⋅ (𝜋, 𝑦) = 𝑏 𝑎 ∈ ℝ𝑛, 𝑏 ∈ ℝ
15Note that we represent priors and guesses as ∣𝒳 ∣-dimensional vectors.
However, it is sometimes convenient to drop the last coordinate: in the case
∣𝒳 ∣ = 2 a prior (𝑥, 1−𝑥) can be represented by a single point 𝑥 (Figure 1).
(which means that the last coordinate of the normal should
not be 0; any other value can be scaled to 1) is the graph of
𝑔𝑤(𝜋) for a guess vector 𝑤 = 𝑏1− 𝑎.
In the case of two dimensions (∣𝒳 ∣ = 2), priors can be
represented by a single real 𝑥 = 𝜋𝑥1 ∈ [0, 1], and the graph of
𝑔𝑤 is a line, as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that, the individial
gains 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥1), 𝑔(𝑤, 𝑥2) correspond to the points where the
hyperplane hits the lines 𝑥 = 0 and 𝑥 = 1.
The idea for creating a 𝑔-vulnerability 𝑉𝑔 that coincides with
an arbitrary 𝕍 is to create one guess for each prior 𝜋 ∈ 𝔻𝒳
and obtain a supporting hyperplane passing through (𝜋,𝕍(𝜋)),
as shown in Figure 1. The hyperplane is the graph of 𝑔𝑤(𝜋),
for a suitably constructed vector 𝑤. Since all hyperplanes are
below 𝕍, and at least one is touching 𝕍 at each 𝜋, then 𝑉𝑔
coincides with 𝕍. Extra care is needed to avoid hyperplanes
orthogonal to the probability hyperplane, since those cannot
be expressed as 𝑔𝑤(𝜋).
Theorem 5. Let 𝕍 : 𝔻𝒳 → ℝ+ be a vulnerability function
satisfying CNTY and CVX. Then there exists a gain function 𝑔
with a countable number of guesses such that 𝕍 = 𝑉𝑔 .
Proof: Let 𝐴 be the elements of the (relative ) interior of
𝔻𝒳 (i.e., 𝜋[𝑖] > 0, ∀𝑖 and ∑𝑖 𝜋[𝑖] < 1) having rational
coordinates. We are going to create one guess 𝑤𝜋 for each such
𝜋 ∈ 𝐴. Since epi𝕍 is convex, and (𝜋,𝕍(𝜋)) ∈ bd(epi𝕍), from
the supporting hyperplane theorem there exists a hyperplane
(𝑎, 𝑐) ⋅ (𝜋′, 𝑦) = 𝑏 𝑎 ∈ ℝ𝑛, 𝑎 ∕= 0, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ ℝ
containing (𝜋,𝕍(𝜋)), and such that epi𝕍 lies above the
hyperplane, i.e., (𝑎, 𝑐) ⋅ (𝜋′,𝕍(𝜋′)) ≥ 𝑏 for all 𝜋′ ∈ 𝔻𝒳 .
In general, the hyperplane might have 𝑐 = 0, which happens
iff it is orthogonal to the hyperplane (0, 1) ⋅ (𝜋′, 𝑦) = 0 of
probability distributions (i.e., the hyperplane containing only
vectors of the form (𝜋′, 0)). We now show that this can only
happen at the (relative) boundary of 𝔻𝒳 , that is, since 𝜋 ∈
int(𝔻𝒳 ), we must have 𝑐 ∕= 0. Assuming 𝑐 = 0, we have
that 𝜋 ⋅ 𝑎 = 𝑏. Since 𝜋 is an interior point, there exists a ball
𝐵𝜖(𝜋) ⊆ 𝔻𝒳 . The hyperplane passes through the center of
the ball, so there exist points in the ball on both sides of the
hyperplane. Thus take 𝜋′ ∈ 𝐵𝜖(𝜋) such that 𝜋′ ⋅ 𝑎 < 𝑏; hence
(𝑎, 𝑐) ⋅ (𝜋′,𝕍(𝜋′)) < 𝑏 which is a contradiction.
Now since 𝑐 ∕= 0, the hyperplane is the graph of 𝑔𝑤 for
𝑤 = 𝑐−1(𝑏1− 𝑎). Hence we have that
𝑤 ⋅ 𝜋 = 𝕍(𝜋) for 𝑤 = 𝜋 , and
𝑤 ⋅ 𝜋 ≤ 𝕍(𝜋) for all 𝜋 ∈ 𝔻𝒳 .
Creating one such guess for each element of 𝐴, we have
𝑉𝑔(𝜋) = sup
𝑤∈𝐴
𝑤 ⋅ 𝜋 = 𝕍(𝜋)
for all 𝜋 ∈ 𝐴, i.e., 𝑉𝑔 and 𝕍 coincide on 𝐴.
Finally, since all irrationals are the limit of a sequence of
rationals, and boundary points are the limit of a sequence of
interior points, from continuity we conclude that 𝑉𝑔 and 𝕍
coincide everywhere.
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Example 19. Let channels 𝐶 and 𝑅 be as follows:
𝐶 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3
𝑥1 1/2 1/4 1/4
𝑥2 1/4 3/4 0
𝑅 𝑧1 𝑧2 𝑧3
𝑦1 1/2 1/2 0
𝑦2 1/3 1/3 1/3
𝑦3 1 0 0
With prior 𝜋 = (3/4, 1/4), we get the two hypers:
[𝜋,𝐶] 7/16 3/8 3/16
𝑥1 6/7 1/2 1
𝑥2 1/7 1/2 0
[𝜋,𝐶𝑅] 17/32 11/32 1/8
𝑥1 14/17 8/11 1/2
𝑥2 3/17 3/11 1/2
Now we show the steps that establish ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶] ≥ ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅],
assuming the axioms of AVG and CVX:
?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶]
=
∑
𝑦 𝑝(𝑦)𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑦) (by AVG)
= 716𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 38𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
+ 316𝕍
[
1
0
]
=
(
7
32 +
7
32
)
𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+
(
1
8 +
1
8 +
1
8
)
𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
+ 316𝕍
[
1
0
]
=
(
7
32𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
+ 316𝕍
[
1
0
])
+
(
7
32𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
])
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
= 1732
(
7
17𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 417𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
+ 617𝕍
[
1
0
])
+ 1132
(
7
11𝕍
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 411𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
])
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
≥ 1732𝕍
(
7
17
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 417
[
1
2
1
2
]
+ 617
[
1
0
])
+ 1132𝕍
(
7
11
[
6
7
1
7
]
+ 411
[
1
2
1
2
])
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
] (by CVX)
= 1732𝕍
[
14
17
3
17
]
+ 1132𝕍
[
8
11
3
11
]
+ 18𝕍
[
1
2
1
2
]
=
∑
𝑧 𝑝(𝑧)𝕍(𝑝𝑋∣𝑧)
= ?ˆ?[𝜋,𝐶𝑅]
APPENDIX C
ELEMENTARY EXAMPLES SUPPORTING SECTION VII
Recall that we take our base space to be 𝒳 , distributions on
that to be 𝔻𝒳 , and hypers to be 𝔻2𝒳 . Typical elements of 𝔻𝒳
are lower-case Greek letters, possibly superscripted. Thus 𝜋𝑥
is the probability 𝜋 assigns to 𝑥 and 𝜋1𝑥 is the probability 𝜋1
assigns to 𝑥 and Δ2𝛿3 is the probability that hyper Δ2:𝔻2𝒳
assigns to distribution 𝛿3:𝔻𝒳 . In Δ𝛿 usually 𝛿 will be in
the support ⌈Δ⌉ of Δ; if not, then of course the assigned
probability is zero.
We (continue to) write the point, or “singleton” distribution
on 𝑥 as [𝑥], so that [𝑥]𝑥′ = (1 if 𝑥=𝑥′ else 0) — it is the same
as 𝜂𝑥 if we are using a monad. A “doubleton” distribution say
𝛿=𝑥1𝑝⊕𝑥2 is such that 𝛿𝑥1=𝑝 and 𝛿𝑥2=1−𝑝. The 𝑝-weighted
sum of two values is defined 𝑥1𝑝+𝑥2 = 𝑝𝑥1+(1−𝑝)𝑥2, thus
not the same thing as 𝑥1𝑝⊕𝑥2: for example if 𝒳 were the reals
ℝ, then 𝑥1𝑝⊕𝑥2 would also be a real, but 𝑥1𝑝⊕𝑥2 would be
a (doubleton) distribution in 𝔻ℝ. Indeed we have 𝑥1𝑝⊕𝑥2 =
[𝑥1]𝑝+[𝑥2]. In both cases the 𝑝-factor applies on the left.
In this section we use 𝜇 more generally than multiply of
a monad, as introduced in Section VII above: here 𝜇 will as
well simply average any distribution taken over a vector space.
Thus in particular we have 𝜇(𝛿1𝑝⊕𝛿2) = 𝛿1𝑝+𝛿2 because
𝛿1 𝑝⊕ 𝛿2, a hyper with just two inners, is in 𝔻2𝒳 = 𝔻(𝔻𝒳 )
and 𝔻𝒳 is a vector space.
We return first return to the higher-order formulation
?ˆ?=𝜇∘𝔻𝕍 of AVG. With a doubleton hyper for illustration,
say Δ = 𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2, that gives
?ˆ?Δ = (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)Δ (apply AVG to Δ)
⇒ ?ˆ?(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) = (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) (Δ = 𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2)
iff ?ˆ?(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) = 𝜇(𝔻𝕍(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2)) (composition)
iff ?ˆ?(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) = 𝜇(𝕍𝜋1𝑝⊕𝕍𝜋2) (definition functor 𝔻)
iff ?ˆ?(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) = 𝕍𝜋1𝑝+𝕍𝜋2 , (property of 𝜇)
showing that ?ˆ? indeed takes the weighted sum of 𝕍 applied
to the (two, in this case) posteriors in Δ. As an illustration
of more general reasoning, we give the proof promised in
Section VII, i.e., that applies even when the weighted average
is not necessarily over just two hypers. We have
?ˆ? ∘ 𝜇
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻𝕍 ∘ 𝜇 (assumption AVG)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻2𝕍 (𝜇 is natural transformation 𝔻2→𝔻)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻𝜇 ∘ 𝔻2𝕍 (monad coherence condition on 𝜇)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻(𝜇 ∘ 𝔻𝕍) (𝔻 functor)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻?ˆ? , (assumption AVG)
which overall equality says intuitively that applying ?ˆ? to
the weighted sum of some hypers, i.e., ?ˆ?(𝜇Δ), is the same†
as applying ?ˆ? to the hypers separately and then taking the
weighted sum of the results, i.e., 𝜇(𝔻?ˆ?Δ).
The higher-order NI captures its traditional definition via
?ˆ?[𝜋]=?ˆ?(𝜂𝜋)=(?ˆ?∘𝜂)𝜋=𝕍𝜋. Here is how the higher-order
version of NI follows from AVG and the monad laws, as we
claimed in Section VII:
?ˆ?∘𝜂
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻𝕍 ∘ 𝜂 (assumption AVG)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝜂 ∘ 𝕍 (𝜂 is natural transformation 1→𝔻)
= 𝕍 . (monad coherence condition 𝜇∘𝜂 = 1)
Applying that to arbitrary 𝜋 gives ?ˆ?(𝜂𝜋) = 𝕍𝜋.
For CVX again we use a doubleton hyper Δ = 𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2
as an example, so that the traditional formulation of CVX is
found in the middle of the following string of equalities:
(𝕍∘𝜇)Δ
= (𝕍∘𝜇)(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2) (definition Δ)
= 𝕍(𝜇(𝜋1𝑝⊕𝜋2)) (composition)
= 𝕍(𝜋1𝑝+𝜋
2) (property of 𝜇)
≤ 𝕍𝜋1 𝑝+ 𝕍𝜋2 (traditional formulation of CVX)
= 𝜇(𝕍𝜋1 𝑝⊕ 𝕍𝜋2) (property of 𝜇)
= 𝜇(𝔻𝕍(𝜋1 𝑝⊕ 𝜋2)) (definition functor 𝔻)
= (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)(𝜋1 𝑝⊕ 𝜋2) (composition)
= (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)Δ , (defintion Δ again)
showing how CVX for this particular Δ agrees with the higher-
order formuation 𝕍∘𝜇 ≤ 𝜇∘𝔻𝕍.
Now we return to the formulation of the partial order ⊑ on
hypers in terms of the surprising “hyper-hyper” Δ in 𝔻3𝒳 .
As we did above (at †), we will assist the intuition by taking
a simple case Δ = Δ1𝑝⊕Δ2, thus a doubleton hyper-hyper
over two hypers Δ1 with probability 𝑝 and Δ2 with probability
1−𝑝. We show that the higher-order definition of ⊑ implies
the 𝕍-based definition, in this case, provided we assume CVX.
(The reverse direction is harder, related to the Coriaceous
Conjecture described in [5] and proved in [6], [11].)
We start by setting Δ+=𝜇Δ and Δ−=(𝔻𝜇)Δ, as in the
higher-order formulation of ⊑ from which we would expect
to be able to prove that ?ˆ?Δ+ ≥ ?ˆ?Δ−. Then we have
?ˆ?Δ+
= ?ˆ?(𝜇Δ) (definition Δ+)
= ?ˆ?(𝜇(Δ1𝑝⊕Δ2)) (definition Δ)
= ?ˆ?(Δ1𝑝+Δ
2) (property of 𝜇)
= ?ˆ?Δ1 𝑝+ ?ˆ?Δ
2 (linearity of ˆ𝕍, implied by AVG)
= (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)Δ1 𝑝+ (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍)Δ2 (assume AVG)
≥ (𝕍∘𝜇)Δ1 𝑝+ (𝕍∘𝜇)Δ2 (assume CVX)
= 𝜇((𝕍∘𝜇)Δ1 𝑝⊕ (𝕍∘𝜇)Δ2) (property 𝜇)
= 𝜇(𝔻(𝕍∘𝜇)(Δ1 𝑝⊕Δ2)) (functor 𝔻)
= (𝜇∘𝔻𝕍∘𝔻𝜇)Δ (composition; functor 𝔻; defintion Δ)
= ?ˆ?(𝔻𝜇Δ) (assume AVG; composition)
= ?ˆ?Δ− . (definition Δ−)
The hard-core higher-order proof, for general Δ, is in effect
a soundness proof for ⊑, that it can only decrease vulnerability
(given CVX and AVG); and because of the great generality of
the monad framework [18] it applies even for infinite state
spaces 𝒳 and measures. Although less intuitive (at first), it is
much shorter:
?ˆ? ∘ 𝜇
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻?ˆ? (linearity of ˆ𝕍, proved earlier at †)
≥ 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻(𝕍 ∘ 𝜇) (AVG and CVX; see ‡ below)
= 𝜇 ∘ 𝔻𝕍 ∘ 𝔻𝜇 (𝔻 functor)
= ?ˆ? ∘ 𝔻𝜇 , (AVG with “the other 𝜇”)
so that the longer proof just above is recovered by applying
each line to Δ = Δ1𝑝⊕Δ2.
The “see below” appeals to the elementary general fact that ‡
if two functions 𝑓, 𝑓 ′:𝒮→ℝ satisfy 𝑓(𝑠)≥𝑓 ′(𝑠) for all 𝑠:𝒮 ,
then also (𝜇∘𝔻𝑓)(𝛿) ≥ (𝜇∘𝔻𝑓 ′)(𝛿) for all 𝛿 in 𝔻𝒮 , in words
that if two random variables over the same distribution satisfy
≥ everwhere, then so do their expected values. Above we used
𝑓=?ˆ? and 𝑓 ′=𝕍∘𝜇 and 𝒮=𝔻2𝒳 , appealing to AVG and CVX
for the inequality.
